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The topic of MNC international entry choice is relatively developed and has been growing for
more than two decades in IB (international business) area. Since one of the basic questions of IB
research is why and how firms go aboard, the topic of how and why firms choose certain entry
strategies into host countries has been brought to the table and gained much attention by the
scholars. Despite of the development in IB field, this research on entry choice in the area of
hospitality hasn’t progressed much. This gap could be shown by comparing the theories that are
used or established for explaining international expansion in IB area with those applied in
hospitality field. This paper aims to summarize and compare the researches on this topic in both
fields, shedding light on the future research on international expansion in the area of hospitality
management. Several worth-noting theories and research agenda in management and IB field
are suggested by the authors. The paper is structured into three sections. First, it reviews the
different categories of entry choices from different perspectives. Then it elaborates the six most
commonly applied theoretical perspectives on international entry choice: transaction cost
economies, resource based view, perspective of knowledge flows, agency theory, institutional
theory, and Dunning’s eclectic framework. Finally, a brief review on entry choice in hospitality
field and suggestions on the future research in hospitality industry are illustrated in the paper.
Entry choice categories
Although there is not complete listing of mode structures exists, the mostly investigated choice is
between wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) and joint ventures (JV). Some studies have also
explored the choice between contracts and equity (franchising contracts vs. company-owned
outlet, management contracts vs. production subsidiaries). Brouthers and Hennart (2007) have
identified 16 different entry modes based on the previous studies. According to their argument,
there are two main views on the meaning and the categories of entry modes. The first perspective
considers contracts, JVs and WOSs as a continuum of increasing control, commitment and risk.
WOS would be chosen if MNCs exert maximum control, make maximum commitment and take
on maximum risks. Contracts would be selected when MNCs want minimum control, make
relatively less commitment and take on minimum risks. Based on this view, scholars identified
several mode structures. For instance, Erramilli and Rao (1990) identified 11 types of entry mode
namely ranging from Greenfield WOS venture to licensing and franchising; Anderson and
Gatignon (1986) listed 17 mode structures ranging from WOSs to small shareholder
organizations. From this point of view, certain variables determine the choices. For example, low
asset specificity determines licensing and intermediate asset specificity predicts JVs, and high
asset specificity determines WOSs.

The second perspective is represented by Hennart (1988, 2000), who doesn’t agree that JV is a
step in the continuum between contracts and WOS but categorized entry modes into two types,
contracts and equity (JVs and WOSs). The main difference between the contract and equity is,
in Hennart’s opinion, is the fact that input suppliers are paid ex post from the profits of the
venture in equity, while in contracts the payments are specified ex ante. Hennart further argued
that the former is efficient when defining what they must contribute is difficult ahead of time and
measuring contribution is costly after the cooperation. Hennart (2000) also mentioned buying
local factors of production is sometimes difficult. The firms with the hard-to-transact assets will
integrate into WOS if the assets can be bought on the market; in contrast, if the assets held by the
MNE can be easily purchased on the market, a local firm with hard-to-transact assets will
contract the technology and establish a domestic WOS. When both the MNC’s and local firm’s
assets are hard to transact, JV would occur. Thus Hennart (1988) argued that JVs are not an
intermediate entry mode between market and hierarchy but rather a solution of the double market
failure. He also mentioned that JVs are categorized in the hierarchy/equity category, and “JVs
are the any type of setup where input providers are paid for their inputs through a share of the
profits of the venture.” Meanwhile, the partial acquisitions and JV Greenfields should be
categorized as JVs. This is not in line with the literature such as Kogut & Singh (1988) who
argued that the term JV refers to the shared new ventures with separate legal personalities.
Brouthers and Hennart (2007) adapted and adopted Hennart (2000)’s definition of the JVs and
differentiate contracts, WOSs and JVs as shown by Figure 1.
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In sum, Brouthers and Hennart (2007) adapted Hennart (2000)’s model of entry modes ,
classified the modes of entry into three cells (JV, WOS by local firm and WOS by MNE), and
shows JV is not some intermediate form between market and hierarchy but results from joint
internalization because of double market failure (Hennart, 1998). Moreover, the authors also
distinguishes the level of ownership (contracts, JV, WOS) and the establishment mode
(Greenfield vs. acquisitions), both of which are mixed used by scholars.
Meyer et al. (2009a) classified modes of FDI into three types: Greenfield, acquisition, and Joint
Venture (JV). JVs partially integrate local resources from a local partner and acquisitions
integrate the local firm in toto. Both of JV and acquisition offer access to resources that are held
by local firms. Greenfield doesn’t directly approach local firm as organizational resources but
allow the MNC to purchase or contract for local resources. The authors stated that there are two
sequential stages in the entry decisions; firstly deciding partial ownership (JV) vs. full ownership
(acquisition/Greenfield), and then choosing between acquisition and Greenfield if full ownership

is preferred. But in practice, they argue, the two stages are often blurred, such that studies
examine the three entry choices simultaneously (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Chang and
Rosenzweig, 2001; Elango and Sambharya, 2004).
From the perspective of ways of obtaining resources and capabilities, Andreu, Claver and Quer
(2010) stated that there are three entry strategies, namely internal growth (developing resources
on its own), external growth (acquiring firms which possess the needed resources and
capabilities), and intermediate or cooperative growth (cooperating with other companies that
own the needed resources and capabilities).
Scholars have kept on looking at and defining entry modes from different levels and
perspectives. Besides these various definitions of entry choice per se, scholars have tried to
explain the phenomena of international expansion through using different theories, such as
transaction cost economies, resource based view, knowledge flow perspective, agency theory,
institutional theory, and eclectic paradigm.

Transaction cost economies
From the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective, the choice of entry mode is the one that
minimizes the transaction costs due to the asset specificity, high frequency, uncertainty, and
opportunism (Williamson, 1981, 1985). TCE suggests that firms try to evaluate the cost and
benefit of operating and transacting related to the different entry modes in the local markets.
Since the market imperfection exists and causes the misunderstanding, conflict that leads to
delay, breakdown, or malfunction, the choice of entry strategy depends on a comparison of
coordination costs incurred from internalization and the transaction costs arising from interaction
with potential partners in local markets (Brouthers, 2002). The international joint venture lies
between the pure market mode (ex. contract) and wholly owned strategy and it is preferred over
the market mode when market imperfection is significant for intermediate product, especially the
industry or country specific knowledge and key access to distribution channels are required. It is
more difficult or expensive to acquire or replicate the assets that are necessary to produce the
intermediary goods (Hennart, 1998).
Asset specificity is a central variable in the majority of these studies. But the related researches
found mixed results about this explanatory variable. Some studies’ results support for TCE’s
prediction that high asset specificity is related to the use of high control modes (whole owned
subsidiary) (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers et al. 2003; Makino & Neupert, 2000); but
other studies found the opposite effect (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Palenzuela & Bolillo, 1999).
Brouthers and Hennart (2007) ‘s review indicates that the majority of transaction cost-based
entry mode studies tends to find no significant relationship between asset specificity and entry
mode choice (e.g., K. D. Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Gatignon &
Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Taylor, Zou, &
Osland, 1998).
Frequency is another dimension that affects firm entry mode choices (or boundary decisions),
according to Williamson (1985), the choice between market contracting and integrating
transactions within the firm. The fixed costs involved in integrating transactions in the firm can
only be justified when the volume of transactions is large enough. Thus frequency is an
important determinant of the choice between contracts and equity.

Resource based view
From the resource based view (RBV), the choice of international expansion hinges on whether
and to what extent the expanding investing firms require context-specific (location-bounded)
resources to achieve the competitive advantages (Meyer & Peng, 2005). The main analysis
centers on the extant assets exploitation or resources augmentation for the purpose of creating
new resources, both of which contribute to the link between MNCs’ resource endowments and
their growth path in international expansion (Meyer, et al. 2009b). Context-specific resources
could be obtained from network, relationships with related firms, distribution channels and even
government authorities, especially in the emerging economies where formal institutions are weak
(Peng & Heath, 1996). Context-specific capabilities such as organizational flexibility, ability to
managing local labor forces and capability of managing interfaces with local government are all
considered to be critical factors to achieve competitiveness. MNCs in this case may prefer to
establish their foreign operations with a local partner as a joint venture or through acquisition,
especially when MNCs purse in intangible rather than tangible assets since the former is likely to
involve higher level of information asymmetries due to the knowledge –components of resources
(Meyer et al. 2009b).
Andreu et al (2010) apply RBV to testing the factors that influence the entry choice of Spanish
tourism firms into new businesses. They argue that resource diversification contributes to longterm sustainability and regional development (Ivars, 2003). Diversification has many advantages
especially for the tourism industry which depends on regional resources in terms of economy,
culture, nature and history.
Entry mode choice is one of the main decisions in the diversification process. Montgomery
(1994) argued that diversification on firm level is a function of its resource stock. Diversification
may reflect a shortage of certain resources and capabilities that the firm needs for the purpose of
taking the strategy, which in turn can determine the entry mode. According to Andreu et al.
(2010), there are three entry strategies, namely internal growth, external growth, and
intermediate or cooperative growth (cooperating with other companies which have the resources
and capabilities). Meanwhile, Andreu et al. (2010) pinpointed the factors that influence the entry
mode are categorized into two sets, namely the traits of the sector and the internal composition of
resources and capabilities within the organization (Chatterjee & Singh, 1999); and other factors
such as managerial experience, agency problems and the availability of information that may
dilute the influence of purely economic factors.
They hypothesized that the degree of similarity between the new business and the company’s
original business positively associated with choice of internal growth. This conforms with Miller
(2004) ‘s argument that firms using internal growth rather than external growth pursue less
extensive diversification. They also proposed that the greater the company’s diversifying
experience, the greater the likelihood that entry into the new business will take place via internal
growth. The empirical results conform to previous studies which show that internal development
is the best option for related diversification, while external development and cooperation
agreements are more suitable for unrelated diversification, their findings also illuminate that
tourism firms that have adopted these patterns have achieved higher profitability.
Knowledge transfer perspective

The perspective of knowledge transfer holds that the choice of entry mode relies on whether the
knowledge is transferrable and the transfer is less costly. There are two kinds of knowledge, one
is tacit knowledge and the other is common architecture knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1993).
The former is less codifiable and hard to teach, and the latter is codifiable and easy to transfer.
According to their empirical study, the choice of transfer mode is determined by the efficiency of
knowledge transfer. The firms would choose equity entry mode if there is large amount of tacit
knowledge transfer and non-equity entry mode if large amount of common architecture
knowledge is required.
Management of knowledge flows within and across a firm’s boundary is critical to strategic
success in a globalized competitive context. Hence, a global lodging firm can be regarded as a
knowledge-based service company and consequently the hotel firm’s registered brand names, as
well as unregistered, but proprietary reservations and logistics systems constitute codified
strategic assets, which are a potent source of control over partners who are likely to conduct
opportunistic behaviors (Contractor & Kundu, 1998). On the other hand, transferring tacit
knowledge to a partner firm in a foreign nation can be difficult and costly, as it depends on, to a
large extent, the absorptive capacity of learning new knowledge (Cohen & levinthal, 1990). Thus
non-equity form of entry mode such as franchising can be less prevalent in developing countries
(Contractor & Kundu, 1998).
Agency theory
Agency theory has been intensively on the fundamental concern related to the separation of
ownership and control, and it highlights the importance of information transfer process. In the
agency theory, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard due to differences in interest
and risk preferences existed between investors and managers, address the difficulties of assessing
the capabilities and performance of foreign employees (managers), indicating less preference of
non-equity and low-control entry mode such as franchising, in which the critical source of
control is through the stern enforcement of franchising contract (Quinn & Doherty, 2000). In
contrast, foreign institutional investors with globally diversified investing portfolios and superior
administration capabilities are more likely to perform high-risk entry decisions especially in
emerging market (Filatotchev et al. 2007). The phenomena of large amount of international
merger and acquisition could be explained by the self-interest of managers who care about their
careers, prestige power, and salary, job security (Haunschild, 1993).
Institutional theory
“Institutions” refers to the “rule of the game” (North, 1990) and are capable of shaping firm
strategies in relation to foreign market entry (Peng, 2003). Scott (1995) defined the institutional
environment in terms of three "pillars" being -the regulative, normative, and cognitive domains.
North (1990) divided the institutional distance into two aspects, formal and informal. The
perspective of institutional theory brings up the issue of institution from the “background” to the
front and would enrich the study on the drivers of firm strategy and performance in IB (Peng,
Wang and Jiang, 2008). Institution theory suggests that legitimacy is crucial to the survival of
firms. The decision of cross-border M&A largely depends on whether MNEs are able to easily
and economically obtain legitimacy in the host country (Eden & Miller 2004; Kostova & Zaheer,
1999; Xu & Shenkar 2002). MNEs that conduct acquisition would find it easier to obtain

external legitimacy and internal consistency in host countries which have relatively small
institutional distances (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).
Recent researches show that institutions are more than background conditions and can directly
determine entry strategies, especially for the institutions in emerging economies, which is weak
and far different from those developed in the developed countries. In a weak institution which
lacks strong formal institutions, network (Guan Xi) among managers would function as informal
institutions that substitute the lacking formal institution and facilitate the economic transactions
(Peng et al, 2008). Thus alliances-based entry mode such as international joint venture can
become a preferred strategic choice in weak institutional context (Peng, 2006). Xu and Shenkar
(2002) also analyzed the entry choice under the circumstances of institutions. They argue that the
longer regulative institutional distance is positively associated with Greenfield, and the cognitive
and normative institutional distance is negatively associated with merger and acquisition.
The factor of institutions has gained much attention and was considered as the third leg of
“strategy tripod” which comprises institution-based view, industry-based view, and resourcebased view of IB strategy. (Peng et al, 2008). Some scholars found institutions interact or
influence the entry choice. For instance, Meyer et al. (2009a) found that institutional and
resource effects crucially interact. They stated that the entry modes—Greenfield, acquisition, and
joint venture facilitate firms to overcome different market inefficiencies associated with two
characteristics of the resources and to the institutional context. Stronger Institutions ensure a
higher degree of market effectiveness which encourages acquisitions. Thus JVs are chosen to
approach many local resources in a weaker institutional framework, but it becomes less
important in a stronger institutional framework where acquisition plays a more crucial role in
accessing intangible and organizationally embedded resources.
Eclectic paradigm
Dunning’s OLI or Eclectic paradigm framework is among the most commonly adopted
perspectives in the studies of cross-border entry modes. This OLI perspective was set up for the
purpose of a distinguishable theory and later was developed as a holistic framework that brings
concepts and theories from previous works together into one integrated construct. The three
elements of Dunning’s OLI paradigm are ownership advantages, location advantages, and
internalization advantages. Since it is not a theory, Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm could be
considered as a vehicle that integrate insights from resource-based (firm-specific), transaction
cost economies (internalization), and institutional (location) theories (Brouthers and Hennart,
2007) and that investigates how these theories interact with each other.
Many studies applied this approach to the research on entry modes (Agarwal and Ramaswami
1992; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999; Cloninger, 2004; Tsai & cheng 2002; Nakos & Brouthers,
2002, etc.). Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner (1999) ‘s study shows that Dunning’s framework
explains very well the firm performance and the fact that firms which choose entry mode based
on the firm-specific (ownership), location-specific and internalization advantages tend to have
better subsidiary performance. Tatoglu and Glaister (1998) investigated the investments in
Turkey and found that OLI paradigm may affect manufacturing and service industry in a
different manner.
One of the good papers on entry mode was written by Brouthers and Hennart (2007), who
reviewed the literature on international entry mode choice and gives a holistic view of the works
on entry mode across the years of researches. Meanwhile, it pinpoints the weaknesses of the

literature, and provides some suggestions on the further research. The authors addressed that the
motive for entry may have a significant influence on the establishment modes besides the TCE,
RBV, IT and OLI. And the interaction between strategic motives and other variables such as
cultural differences is also worth further research. The authors pointed out although there is less
research on SME mode choice, those theories for large firm mode decisions could be generalized
to SME entry modes. In addition, the issue that firm boundaries influence the performance was
ignored. The mode choice influences subsidiary performance. Finally, the authors provided
directions for future theory development. They suggested that existing theories needs deepening,
new and different theories such as strategic decision making (SDM) research that could help us
gain a better understanding of mode choice decisions. The author also provides new and different
methodologies such as multilevel sample analysis for the future research on entry mode.
Hospitality management field
In the research of entry choice in hospitality industry, Zhao (1993) completed the pioneer study
that integrates the international strategic management perspective and international business
perspective to investigate the antecedents of multinational lodging firms’ international entry
choices. The results showed that multinational lodging firms’ selecting modes into foreign
markets are determined by two categories of antecedent factors—external environment including
political, economic, socio-cultural, technological and ecological factors; and internal
environment in terms of competitor, customer, property location, supplier, strengths, partner
selection and human factors (Zhao & Olsen, 1997). This study shows no relationship between the
generic international strategies (such as Brand portfolio, niche market, standardization and
adaptation, etc.) and entry modes. It also reveals that multinational lodging firms try to apply
multiple entry modes at the mean time and their selection of entry modes are likely to be
influenced by the degree of maturity of the host country. The study also indicates that minority
equity participation is usually inseparable to management contract or franchise. Overall, the
research found that the matches between the external and internal environment may affect the
entry mode decision of multinational lodging firms, who may choose a wholly owned or longterm lease entry mode if it has strong tangible assets. If a firm holds intangible assets and prefers
to use similar operational modality used at home country, while the host countries expect the
company to share those intangible assets, management contract or franchising may be
appropriate entry mode. But multinational lodging firms need to modify their non-equity
involvement into minority equity involvement to fit the requests from their partners in the host
countries.
Looking at the literature in hospitality field after 1994, there are only a few articles centering on
international entry mode. Contractor and Kundu (1998) conducted an empirical study on the
organizational forms in the international hotel sector. Domke-Damonte (2000) studied the
interactive effects of international strategy and throughput technology on service firms’ entry
mode. Gannon and Keith (1997) highlighted the possibilities and difficulties of socialization
control in different entry modes in the international hotel industry. Brown, Dev and Zhou (2003)
advocated that the ownership and control dimension of international entry mode should be
separated and that cross-border entry mode decisions should be expanded to business activities
beyond production and distribution. Recently, Andreu et al. (2010) applies RBV to explaining
the relationships among diversification, entry choice and profitability in Spanish tourism
industry. Gannon, Roper, and Doherty (2010) demonstrate that management contracts as “asset
light” options for international market entry not only offer valuable equity and strategic

opportunities but also decrease international hotel companies’ chances of developing and
sustaining competitive advantage of human resources. They pinpointed that hotel firms should
leverage their specific market entry expertise and develop mutually supportive relationships with
their property-owning partners for the purpose of surmounting the challenges of managing
human resources in the complex owned arrangement (management contracts).
Discussion
As shown above, there are generally two limitations in hospitality management research on this
topic. Theoretically speaking, the management and IB theories used in the entry choice literature
have not been fully applied in the hospitality field. Only the Eclectic paradigm, RBV and agency
theory have been commonly applied in the field of hospitality management. Despite that
hospitality field possesses special characteristics in terms of service features and ownership
structures which may influence the form and motivation of international expansion, more
attempts are imperative to test other theories that are commonly utilized in the hotel industry, one
industry of the service sector. More interesting results may occur if empirical researches show
some certain theories are particularly improper or proper in the hotel industry. Moreover,
interesting findings might be shown if new theories immerge especially for the hospitality
industry. Moreover, some papers are at the initial stage of elaborating facts and cases and haven’t
used nor relate those facts to theories to explain the phenomena. This might result from the
initially underdeveloped stage of research on this topic. More rational analysis based on theories
is expected to improve research in hospitality field and bridge the gap between management and
IB research and hospitality research.
Methodologically speaking, such research in hospitality field lacks empirical analysis based on
big sample size. This probably results from the considerable amount of private hospitality
companies from which it is hard to obtain data. Many papers employ case studies which is an
effective and necessary theory-exploring tool at the initial stage of theoretical development.
However, such method tool doesn’t help much on establishing and developing theories at the
next stages. Therefore more quantitative studies and the combination of both qualitative and
quantitative studies are in badly needed to explore and set up theories exclusively in hospitality
or service sector due to the special traits it possesses.
Besides these, some new findings in management and IB research shed lights on certain issues
such as the motivations of foreign expansion. While market-seeking or resource-seeking
motivations will always characterize some portion of investment, there is an increasing role for
the efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset seeking investment, which makes mergers and
acquisitions as well as strategic alliances critical to the asset-augmenting FDI. A benefit of
multinationality could be regarded as the access to specific geographically dispersed resources.
The new development of quasi hierarch modality such as increasing application of cooperative
arrangements is mainly due to critical constraint—net cost. Stability and trust in the network
setup can be a critical management challenge as the costs of monitoring network activities can be
substantial (Lundan & Hagedoorn, 2001). Some uses resource dependence perspective to explain
M&A, which is a response to the constraints environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Haunschild,
1993). When considered purely in terms of cash flow constraints, JV, minority ownership in
subsidiaries and non-equity cooperative alliances have become modalities that are more
attractive as many globally competitive firms have become squeezed the profits. This is
particularly the case in recent years due to intensive global competition in the international
hospitality industry and dramatic economic recession taking place in western world.

Furthermore, more topics revolving around entry choice are about to be paid attention, such as
the comparison on the performance of each entry mode and the exit strategy in certain contexts.
Slangen & Hennart (2008) compared the performance of acquisitions and Greenfield and stated
that low and intermediate levels of subsidiary integration contribute to higher performance of
acquisitions than that of Greenfield, and higher integration makes Greenfields outperform
acquisitions. Some IB scholars (Dai, 2010) have noticed the exit strategies that MNC took under
certain circumstances such as war etc. Hospitality firms also determine to exit markets after
certain years’ operation. What are the antecedents of the exit strategy? Would it be possible to
contribute the decision to war, institutional distances, geographical distances, economical clash,
etc? These areas have much research potential in the area of hospitality management.
Conclusion
This paper picks six main theoretical perspectives which are commonly applied by scholars in
explaining the entry mode. They are transaction cost analysis, the resource-based view,
knowledge transfer perspective, agency theory, institutional theory, and Dunning’s eclectic
framework. TCE argues that managers suffer from bounded rationality, whereas potential
partners may opportunistically act if given the chance. Asset specificity, uncertainty and
frequency are the three TCE factors that influence entry choice. The resource-based view
(including knowledge-based and organizational capabilities theories) suggests that firms acquire
a set of firm-specific resources and capabilities that are valuable and inimitable, and develop
proprietary resources that they can exploit in foreign markets or use foreign markets as a source
for developing new resource-based advantage. But the issue is that the measures of resource are
debatable, and such perspective needs to be complemented by other perspectives such as TCE or
institutional theory. Knowledge transfer perspective holds entry choice depends on the easiness
of transferring knowledge based on the traits of the knowledge. Agency theory emphasizes the
high risks of low-control entry mode resulting from self-interest inclination of foreign partners.
The institutional theory suggests that country-level institutional environment influences firms’
entry choices because of the host countries’ institutions refine or facilitate firms’ operation by
“rule of the game”. The eclectic framework brings together three components, ownership,
location advantages, and internalization advantages to explain the entry choices.
However, the above theories that are commonly used in management and IB research haven’t
fully applied in hospitality field. This research in hospitality industry is still on the initial stage of
theoretical development, characterized by the lack of theory application and simply
methodologies. Furthermore, while motives for international expansion are gained sufficient
attention by management, IB and hospitality management scholars, other variables such as the
performance of different the entry modes are worth further study. There is less attention on the
institutional influences on the entry choice and they are always considered as control variables.
Such variables as institutional distance which are heat-discussed in management and IB field
also need more consideration. Finally, theories on international entry choice exclusively for
hospitality or service industry are expected to be set up by leveraging management and IB
theories and applying the traits of hospitality firms.
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